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Abstract 
How important is spatial identity in shifting preferences for redistribution? This paper takes 
advantage of within-country variability in the adoption of a single currency as an instrument 
to examine the impact of the rescaling of spatial identity in Europe. We draw upon data 
from the last three decades of waves of the European Values Survey and we examine the 
impact of joining the single currency on preferences for redistribution. Our instrumentation 
strategy relies on using the exogenous effect of joining a common currency, alongside a 
battery of robustness checks and alternative instruments. Our findings suggest that joining 
the euro has a boosting effect on European identity; an opposite and comparable effect is 
found for national pride. We find that European identity increases preferences for 
redistribution, and that national pride exerts an equivalent reduction in preferences for 
redistribution. 
 
Keywords: spatial identity, Europe, welfare state support 
JEL Code: D69, O52, H53 
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1. Introduction 
We still know relatively little about what shapes preferences for redistribution. The 
standard political economy theory of redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981, Romer 
1975), linking the expansion of gross income inequality to increased demands for 
redistribution, has not been consistently validated in practice (Georgiadis and Manning 
2012, Gouveia and Masia 1998). Other explanations focus on the presence of biased 
perceptions of redistribution,1 the expectations of offspring social mobility (Banabou and 
Ok 2001), the influence of ethnic fractionalisation (Alesina et al. 2001) or the role of 
genetics.2 
 
Here we focus on the influence of social identity on preferences for redistribution, that is, 
the presence of common reference points (prescriptions) acting as social norms (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2000) which influence behaviour within the social group; the identity 
mechanism then confers some sense of social solidarity on the members of the group. If 
identity plays this role and solidarity is determined within the context of the nation, a 
move from that setting to another will affect people’s preferences for redistribution. 
However, it may be that the development of a European identity affects the extent of 
solidarity and individual experiences within a wider community. The move from the default 
of national solidarity expression may be pro-redistributive. 
Identity might contribute to the development of cognitive biases insofar as a person’s 
reference group is not the whole population but that of his group, or his country. People 
in relatively rich countries may perceive themselves as being poorer than they really 
are, not so much because of an information bias, but because their reference point is 
based on the social group they identify with, and not necessarily the whole population. 
So an important question for empirical purposes is that of identifying whether an 
exogenous change in reference point, such as the relevant spatial dimension of identity 
(Europe v national), exerts an influence on distributional preferences. Ignoring identity 
and relying on an individualistic model of self-interested demand for redistribution will 
underestimate the benefits of redistribution itself.3 Processes of regional integration offer a 
unique natural experiment to examine such a question in the field. 
 
Social identities shape individuals’ preferences by defining a “sense of belonging” to a 
club good that appears in people’s utility functions (Akerlof 1997). Accordingly, an 
individual suffers disutility from deviating from his or her category norms, which induces 
behavior and influences preferences has wide- ranging implications for welfare economics4 
 
1 It is common to find some disconnect between how preferences are perceived and true distribution 
of wealth and income. Norton and Ariely (2011) find that perceptions of wealth distribution do not 
correspond to real wealth distribution in the US. Reducing the information bias that individuals have with 
regards to their position in the income distribution influences redistributive preferences (Cruces et al. 2013). 
2 Zakharov and Ponarin (2013) examined data from redistribution in Russian regions and find that 
individuals with similar genetic makeup (L allele) systematically prefer more redistribution. 
3  Carlsson et al. (2014) find that pro-social preferences are stable over time in an experimental setting. 
4  Social identity has been suggested to reduce altruism and redistribution (Luttmer 2001, Shayo 2009, 
Costa-Font and Cowell 2015). 
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that conforms to those norms (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). The extent to which identity is 
feeling part of a group triggers more positive social evaluation towards the group (Cremer 
and Vugt 1999, Gaertner et al. 1989). The substitution of a national currency by a 
common currency (the euro) may have triggered some salience to the European project 
resulting in a greater weight of the European component of people’s identity; at the same 
time identity may remain highly valued as a position good, especially for European 
countries that did not enjoy the club status with their own national attachments. 
Identification with a polity largely depends on the status of the groups compared to the 
alternative possible status (Roccas 2003). 
Our focus in this paper is on individuals’ redistributive preferences, and we claim that 
the development of a European identity resulting from institutional reforms such as the 
introduction of a common currency provides quasi- experimental evidence to examine it. 
Europe is the ideal setting to study changes in identity, given that the progressive 
integration process exerts effects on welfare-state institutions, which in turn can 
influence the existing welfare institutions by affecting people’s redistributive 
preferences. The unique experience of the setting up of a single currency exerted a 
non-neutral effect on European attachment as measured by confidence in the EU, and 
reduced national pride. This result is consistent with other findings that indicate that 
European identity explains satisfaction with democracy (Hobolt 2012). Similarly, Risse 
(2010) finds that people who identify themselves as European are more likely to 
identify with the values of tolerance and democracy. 
 
The intuition behind the paper is that, when identity is defined by a “broader other,” 
people are more likely to express a preference for true redistribution (redistribution in 
small communities might be partially explained by exchange motivations instead). 
Becoming part of the Eurozone club in a setting where redistribution is primarily 
undertaken by national welfare states should not change the individual’s expectation of 
benefiting from redistribution, and should primarily affect the rescaling of people’s 
spatial identity. However, there is a potential reverse causality that should be taken 
into account: a revival of anti- European nationalism (which we proxy here by national 
pride) is underpinned by anti-immigration attitudes; also there might be a problem with 
omitted- variable bias if some confounding variables correlated with identity.  In this paper 
we propose an instrumental-variable strategy that takes advantage of the adoption of a 
common currency (a largely exogenous decision to individuals themselves). We focus 
on countries that adopted the common currency only after its inception so that we can 
observe a period before and after being part of the common  
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currency. We use other instruments to measure the robustness of our results. Finally, 
we use different subsamples to ascertain whether the results hold beyond the specific 
country sample. 
Our paper brings together different strands of the literature. We incorporate some 
findings from the European politics literature suggesting that some aspects of national 
identity are substituted for, with the expansion of European identity. This not only 
changes people’s affiliations but also preferences towards equality. In a more 
competitive setting, such as that of a wider European Union, wide inequalities are 
likely to emerge and so the role of redistributive mechanisms becomes more important. 
We contribute to the literature on preference for redistribution and the limitations of the 
Meltzer and Richard approach. Third the paper contributes to the role of identity in 
influencing economic behaviour (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2005). If changes in 
institutions affect people’s preferences by changing their identification and collective 
affiliations then policy needs to be focused more strongly on such indirect effects. 
Finally, this paper extends the findings of Luttmer (2001), suggesting that preferences for 
redistribution change with the share of the poor in a region, as Eurozone enlargement to 
central and Eastern Europe might have exerted an impact on preferences for 
redistribution. However, we argue that the mechanism for such an effect is channeled 
through identity. 
Section 2 provides the background to the analysis of this paper. Section 3 describes the 
data and methods, section 4 presents results and the paper concludes with section 5. 
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2. Background 
There are two important branches of the economics literature that connect to the 
approach that we use in this paper: the literature on redistributive preferences and the 
literature on the economics of identity. 
 
2.1 Preferences for redistribution 
Economic approaches to redistribution  such  as  Meltzer  and  Richard  (1981) 
typically assume that people’s position in society determines their preferences5 and often 
disregard how people’s social groupings influence preferences. But groupings are 
important: for example, ethnically diverse societies exhibit less class conflict or, if they 
do, it is more rare as ethnicity or identity add additional dimension to the political spectrum 
away from purely economic or redistributive questions (Lee and Roemer 2006). 
In the last twenty years we have seen an increasing interest in examining how 
multiculturalism and diversity influence preferences for redistribution. Alesina et al. 
(2001) find that ethnic fractionalisation exerts an influence on redistributive preferences in 
the context of the United States where the default is not a consolidated welfare state as 
in Europe. Luttmer (2001) finds a negative relationship between diversity and 
preferences for redistribution: people’s preferences for redistribution are interdependent 
in the sense that preference is influenced by the characteristics of other individuals 
around them. People appear to be more likely to redistribute to the groups they identify 
with, be that identification based on ethnicity, religious group, social class, region or 
something else. 
 
Preferences for redistribution have been found to be related to voting behaviour and 
political  ideology,6   to people’s own self-interest,  7   to their  evaluation of inequalities,8  
and to their perceptions of the “leaky bucket”, the efficiency of the transfer mechanism 
(Krawczyk 2010). 
 
Furthermore, redistributive preferences may reflect cultural differences (Luttmer and 
Singhal 2011) and political differences.9 But these differences are not exogenous or 
immutable and may be associated with the phenomenon of identity. 
 
 
5 By “preferences for redistribution” we mean the generalized support for the transfer of resources to ex-ante 
undetermined individuals by a set of mechanisms that include taxation, welfare policies and other. 
6 Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) find evidence that experiencing a recession during early adulthood 
affects preferences for redistribution. 
7 Durante et al. (2014) conducted a laboratory study to test for the role of redistribution, risk aversion 
and social preferences as drivers of preferences for redistribution, finding evidence of all of them but with a 
stronger effect for self-inter  
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2.2  Identity 
 
“Identity” refers to mechanisms through which individuals become attached to each 
other by creating a sense of belonging (Tajfel 1978). Akerlof and Kranton (2000) 
consider identity as an externality on people’s actions triggered by the presence of 
common social norms: these are common reference points that can shift over time. 
Collective identities are the  expressions  of different  cultures which can be an important 
source of preference endogeneity (Bowles 1998) and a recent survey suggests  that they 
can  explain individuals’ solidarity attitudes (Costa-Font and Cowell 2015). People may 
alter their behaviour to conform to other people’s expectations and social norms (Asch 
1951) beyond their narrow personal self-interest.10 
 
Social identity can have inward effects on the person, and an outward effect on the 
group (Mayer and Palmowski 2004). Clearly a person may be associated with multiple 
groups and, as a result, reveal multiple identities – for example regional and European 
identities. Some identities attributed to a person may conflict with each other and even 
become “oppositional” (Battu and Zenou 2010), but others may not.  Identities have been 
seen as a multidimensional social categorization that can be primed by certain 
circumstances or events. Easton (1975) distinguishes instrumental and affective support 
for political institutions. If an institution is perceived as being instrumentally beneficial, 
the attachment to that institution would be expected to increase. Inglehart and Raabier 
(1978) have put forward the theory of cognitive mobilization whereby education exerts an 
effect on individuals’ cosmopolitan identity. 
 
Consider the connection with redistributive preferences discussed in section 2.1. National 
or social identity can act as a “social tie,” which in turn operates in enhancing support 
for the welfare state (Costa-Font and Cowell 2015).11 Redistribution is one of the 
central features of welfare states: maintenance of redistributive institutions largely 
depends on individual support for taxing higher incomes more heavily and targeting 
expenditures to social need. Since such activities are typically associated with nations, 
the question arises whether support for redistributive institutions and programs varies with 
the rescaling of individuals’ identities to both supranational and subnational bodies. 
 
 
8 Fong and Luttmer (2011) find that the source of inequality matters. 
9 For example, countries under socialism exhibited higher redistributive preferences (Corneo and Gruner 
2002). 
10 Klor and Shayo (2010) find experimental evidence that when individual sacrifice was not too high, they 
accommodate their preferences to those of the group. Charness (2007)0 and Chen and Li (2009) show that 
individuals are altruistic towards the people that belong to the group they identify themselves with. Lindqvist 
and Ostling (2013) find that in low tax countries some share of the poor identify with their ethnicity and 
favour low taxes; ethnically homogenous societies exhibit more redistribution 
11 However, the underpinning mechanisms for the tying effect are still not well known. For instance, some 
research in political science argues that the strengthening support of Canadian  national identity lies in the 
effect the welfare state has had in building national identity, and not the other way round (Johnston et al. 
2010). 
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Clearly this is of particular interest with reference to a supranational organisation such as 
the European Union. 
 
2.3 European identity 
In principle European identity could play a role similar to that of American identity, 
uniting people by transcending borders, and especially racial divisions (Transue 2007). A 
superordinate identity eliminates the effects of parochialism, country nationalism and 
group identity. The “European project” certainly raises interesting questions in 
connection with the mechanisms of redistribution and perceptions of identity. With 
European integration, the efficient level of redistribution scales up to the European 
rather than the country level (Cassela and Fray 1992) and is likely to change the 
strength of people’s attachments to state sovereignty as the institutions in member 
countries become locked into this emerging structure (Eichengreen 2008). 
The rise of a European common identity acts on people’s attitudes as a pro- 
redistributive force that confronts the existence of own-nationality bias (Lowes et al. 
2015). This is, perhaps, to be expected as spatial identities are potentially rescaled 
from solely national to the supranational, European, level. However, within this 
structure there is a variety of identities – national, regional, European – and we know little 
about the relations between these identities, whether they are complementary, substitute 
or independent. So it is not clear a priori whether the priming of an identity (as 
mentioned in section 2.2) would exert an external effect on others. 
However, among the variety of priming events that might be considered relevant, one of 
the most important would be the setting up of a common currency. The introduction of a 
single currency encompasses the reduction of one of the most important old symbols of 
national identity; so one should expect it to exert an influence on people’s identification: 
the euro exemplifies the strategy of burning one’s boats. For many countries joining the 
euro club has meant a way to improving their status worldwide, and hence it implied 
positive social externality. Support for the euro has remained stable, even through the 
recent crisis;12 but whether such (largely exogenous) externality leads to stronger 
preference for redistribution is an empirical question. 
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2.4 Our approach 
In this paper we take advantage of an institutional reform, the adoption of the single 
currency, which we argue has had a symbolic effect on priming European identity. The 
introduction of the euro and its effects when the national currencies were effectively 
replaced would be expected to have had an effect on attitudes and preferences. We 
can test whether that effect was stronger for countries that joined the euro initially than 
for the rest. 
 
But capturing identity empirically is not a simple task. Most studies rely on survey 
questions which identify some component of a “latent European identity.” Some 
evidence finds that the stronger is the feeling of national identity, the weaker is support for 
the European Union (Carey 2002). So here we use both national pride and confidence in 
the European Union to proxy the underlying European identity. Our identification 
strategy hinges on taking advantage of cross-country variation in preferences and 
collective identification (social identity) over time. A key challenge is to control for 
potential omitted variables. Indeed, cohort effects are important because individuals of the 
same cohort share similar experiences and observable similar constraints. 
 
Given that our results are affected by a number of potential individual characteristics, 
we look at the presence of heterogeneous effects and subsample analysis and 
robustness checks such as examining the role of additional instruments (such as years 
of citizenship education to instrument European Union confidence and medals in the 
Olympic  games to instrument  national pride, as well as peer effects). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 This is in contrast to trust in European institutions generally, which has fallen. Guiso et al. (2014) find that 
the main determinants of positive sentiment towards the EU is the quality of government, and develop an 
argument on institutional arbitrage: the change in support to EU integration is determined by a change 
in support for the single market and the change in support for a single currency. Positive sentiments 
towards the EU are primarily affected negatively by unemployment and the enlargement post 2004 in 
Southern European countries. Education, age, gender, and the socio-economic status of individuals have 
consistently been found to be salient contributors to individuals’ support for the EU. Age, income, 
occupation, and political values are not merely controls in this analysis but rather contribute to individuals’ 
cognitive development and thus understanding of the EU project (Inglehart 1991). 
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3. Data and Methods 
 
3.1. Data 
Our primary dataset on preference for redistribution and identity is the European 
sample of the World Values Survey, also known as European Values Survey for the 
period 1981-2014. The dataset provides with a series of repeated cross sections 
observations on the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values and opinions of 
citizens all over Europe. We have employed records of individual specific redistributive 
preferences, alongside rich measures of spatial or geographic identity that are recorded 
in the European Values Survey. Specifically, we use self-reported measures of 
individual’s preference for redistribution, which have been validated in previous studies.13 
 
We focus on a set of countries that joined the European Union after 2004. Not all countries 
are covered in each survey wave, but the years range from 1981 to 2014 (for details see 
the summary statistics in the Appendix). Overall we are left with a fairly large sample of 
27,376 respondents. There are several advantages of using such a sample. First,  it 
allows one to identify the effect of joining the common currency (adopting the euro), in 
contrast to using the total sample of European Union countries; the founding countries 
of the euro substituted the currency almost at the same time and hence there is not 
enough variability to exploit.14 The second advantage of using a sample of those that 
joined the euro after 2004 is that there is likely to be an attraction for joining the euro 
club (“institutional arbitrage” in the spirit of Guiso et al. 2014) which plays out in terms 
of boosting European identity and hence “widening the spatial identity beyond the 
national reach.” Finally the introduction of the common currency was an unexpected 
effect within the time frame of the survey questions (4-6 years), and so it is unlikely 
that anticipation effects (on the final success of an  economy in joining a common 
currency) could threaten the identification of the effect on spatial identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
13  Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) show that redistributive preferences correlate in the expected way 
with political leanings. 
14 In addition, exchange rates were pegged from 1999 and hence, the effect of the common currency was 
already expected and discounted for in such a broader sample. 
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As noted, the redistributive preference question is extensively used in the literature, and 
refers to a general question about redistribution without specifying the level of authority 
responsible to make incomes more equal. This way, it can be argued to be 
institutionally neutral. By contrast, national pride relates to restricted loyalties to national 
groups which depend on the perceptions of status of national communities. Hence, in 
this paper we hypothesize that becoming fully part of a larger community (for example 
by joining the euro area) would be expected to weaken the effect of national pride. 
Finally, we use confidence in the European Union. This is a different question from trust 
in the working of European institutions: it  captures in a multi-question format  the 
perceptions of individuals in post-2004 European countries of their degree of 
attachment to the European Union. This question has been found to correlate well with 
other attitudes towards Europe in the sample. 
 
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix show the samples and countries included in the 
dataset alongside the main sample characteristics such as the average age, the 
percentage of women, education attainment, family characteristics and size and political 
affiliation. The sample size of each country is about 1000 respondents. Table A.3 
displays the sample size of the survey waves which is larger for 1991- 98 than the rest. 
Tables A.4 to A.6 show the distribution of the main study variables and Table A.7 the 
proportion of countries that have adopted the euro in the total sample (13%). 
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3.2. The Empirical Strategy 
 
Our identification strategy relies on selecting a sample of countries that have 
progressively joined the European Union for which we can identify a period before 
and a period after they adopt the euro as a currency. In doing so, it is important to 
understand how different this subsample of countries is from the rest of the European 
Union member states. Figures A.1 to A.6 (in Section A.3 of the Appendix) provide plots 
of our variable of interest (preferences for redistribution) and identity variables for the 
subgroup of countries that joined the EU after 2004 and those that joined before. In 
each case there appears to be little difference between the values in the two 
subsamples when plotted across interview years, but there appears to be evidence of 
convergence when we plot over sample waves. We may conclude that examining the 
subsample of countries is likely to allow us to identify the effect of an identity change in 
redistributive preferences. 
Perhaps the most obvious problem in examining the effect of identity on redistributive 
preferences is the endogeneity of identity measures, and specifically the possibility of 
reverse causality whereby identity could be viewed as the effect of the existence of 
redistributive institutions. Furthermore, there might be unobservable variables that 
intermediate the association between identity and redistributive preferences. In order to 
account for the non-random changes in identity, we use an instrumental variable (IV) 
strategy that exploits the exogenous variation of a key institutional change, namely the 
introduction of the euro, which does not directly affect redistributive preferences unless it 
is by changing people’s identification with Europe (the excludability condition). We also 
test for the so-called monotonicity condition to test whether the introduction of the euro 
did indeed affect identity in the expected sign and that the effect is strong (relevance 
condition) which is generally observed by examining the joint significance of first-stage 
estimates in a 2SLS (Staiger’s condition). 
 
Our IV strategy identifies the  local  average effects  of  the impact of  identity changes 
resulting from the introduction of a common currency. In addition, we employ a battery of 
other instruments to examine whether the sign comparisons and results are equally 
robust. Finally, we undertake some placebo tests to make sure our results are not 
spurious. 
 
We have estimated reduced forms of  the effect of identity on redistributive preferences. 
Our identification rests on a combination of cross-sectional, time and cohort variation. In 
some specifications we run cohort-specific regressions to examine the potential 
cohort-specific effects. Country and time-specific trends are controlled for, as they 
could be driving the results. The regression strategy includes a quadratic trend to control 
for all those macroeconomic factors that are varying and exhibit a trend in time. Other 
country-specific time factors are expected to be captured by country fixed effects. 
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The total number of observations is 27,376. Our main dependent variable refers to 
redistributive preferences measured as before. Our treatment variable of interest refers to 
the two variables capturing the effect of identity, namely national pride  and confidence 
in the EU. We include a long list of controls including demographics, income and 
socioeconomic, household size and employment status and we identify whether 
individual are immigrants to the country. The omitted categories in the regressions are 
male, elementary or lower education, all other marital statuses, no children, all other 
employment statuses and no immigrant status. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Preliminary Evidence 
 
Figures 1 and 2 provide data on the cohort and time trends on preference for 
redistribution in the sample of countries examined in this study. The cohort trend 
indicates that those individuals over 55 are more likely to support redistribution. 
Importantly, redistributive preferences have progressively become more salient in 
people’s attitudes in recent survey waves. This effect is not just an artefact of the most 
recent wave. 
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Figures 3 and 4 examine similar trends in national pride indicating an age component to 
it, which is in line with the hypothesis of Europeanisation as reducing national pride: 
Europeanisation may have reduced national attachment. Some research finds time trend 
identification with Europe in EU countries (Fligstein et al. 2012), but identification 
appears to be largely dependent on the economic performance of Europe, particularly 
unemployment (Guiso et al. 2014). Some recent evidence finds that Eastern European 
countries exhibited a comparable or even higher identification with Europe which is in 
large part explained by the large minority groups in many of those European 
member states. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 examine cohort and time trends on EU confidence. Measuring the 
importance of confidence in the EU is important, because being European can mean 
different things across countries whilst confidence with the EU is a commonly accepted 
construct. Interestingly cohort trends show that younger cohorts are more likely to 
identify with Europe, exactly the opposite trend to that of national pride. In contrast, we 
find that time trends suggest a slight reduction in EU confidence. This result is consistent 
with the idea advanced by Fligstein et al. (2012) that European identity is a class-based 
phenomenon directly linked to the transnational mobility benefits of the common EU 
market. However, the rise of European identity might be the effect of educational 
attainment and increasing cultural interconnection. To disentangle such effect we need 
additional regression analysis. 
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4.2 Baseline results 
 
Specifications 
 
Our baseline specification is the following: 𝑅𝑖  = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑟 + 𝛾2𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑟 + 𝛾3𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑟 + 𝛿𝑟 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑟 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑟  refers to the preference-for-redistribution response by an individual 𝑖, 
interviewed at time 𝑡  and in country 𝑟. The variable  𝑡𝑟    refers  to  a  variable 
indicating individuals’ European identity, measured as the individual identification with 
their country (national pride) or Europe (confidence in the European Union). All 
specifications include a vector of individual characteristic 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑟    which  includes  age,  
gender,  schooling,  civil  status,  size  of  the  area  of residence;15   𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑟   is included to 
control for changes in income Ã la  Meltzer and Richard as well as unemployment as 
potentially driving the results; 𝛿𝑟  refers to country fixed effects to control for common 
background of individuals residing in each country, 𝜃𝑡   refers to a wave- (time-) specific 
effect to control  for age- specific trends in redistributive preferences and 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑟  is a 
random term. where euro refers to a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the country 𝑟  
has adopted the common currency at time 𝑡 and a vector of individual characteristics (𝑍𝑖 ). 
As a rule-of-thumb the F-test of such a first  regression should exceed the value 10 for 
the instrument to be strong enough to meet the relevance condition. In addition, the 
excludability condition refers to the absence of a correlation between the error term 
and the instrument. This condition cannot be tested empirically, but we do address 
some issues concerning this assumption by testing the effects of alternative instruments 
that follow a similar rationale, and examining different of suggestive evidence on its 
plausibility. 
 
All regressions have been estimated using OLS to ease the interpretation of 
coefficients, and robustness checks include specifications using alternative techniques 
dealing with the categorical nature of the data, including a binarised identity and 
redistributive preference variable so as to interpret the dependent variable as a 
probability. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and descriptive 
statistics are provided in Tables A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix 
 
In  order  to  estimate  the  2SLS  equation  we  employ  a  first-stage  equation 
capturing the impact of the proposed instrument on the identity questions: 
 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑟 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1euro𝑡𝑟 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑍𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡𝑟 
 
 
 
 
15 Although the notation allows for individual 𝑖, interviewed at time 𝑡 and in country 𝑟 some of these 
characteristics are time-invariant.  
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Baseline regressions 
 
Table 1 reports the regression results to explain redistributive preferences by change in 
national pride and EU confidence. These are OLS results that do not take into account all 
the potential problems of reverse causality and omitted- variable bias. We provide 
different specifications with different controls and the beta coefficients to interpret the 
results as the effects of a one-standard- deviation change. The effects of income are as 
expected, indicated by a negative and significant coefficient. 
 
A one-standard-deviation increase in national pride is found to reduce redistributive 
preferences by the same magnitude (6%) as a one-standard- deviation increase in 
income. As expected, younger individuals are more likely to support redistribution. A one-
standard-deviation increase in the population in tertiary education reduces preferences  
for redistribution by 13%. So the effect of education appears to be twice the size of 
the effect of income. This is an important result, given the focus in the literature on the 
Meltzer and Richard type of approach. Indeed, this coefficient is important as it can 
explain why the income ranking of the median voter would not exert the predicted 
influence. Initially, Columns (1) and (6) report only the coefficient for national pride and 
confidence in the EU respectively. The regressions contained in columns (2) and (7) 
report the effect after the introduction of a quadratic time trend to account for potential 
underlying trends that could be driving the coefficients. Columns (3) and (8) contain the 
effect of adding additional controls for income and employment, and finally Columns (4) 
and (9) contain the effect resulting from the additional control for town size. All regressions 
contain country fixed effects. Overall, the coefficients for national pride exhibit little 
variation in its size. Importantly, unemployment which is a variable that is found to 
explain European identification and trust in European institutions (Guiso et al. 2014) 
does not exert an influence on preferences for redistribution. From all the covariates 
reported here the most important determinant of redistributive preferences appears to 
be education. 
 
Table 2 reports a 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) analysis that controls for reverse 
causality and unobservables. Now confidence in the EU switches its coefficient to being 
positive and significant and exhibits the same coefficient size but with the opposite sign 
to that of national pride (both are statistically significant). Again, the effect’s size 
indicates that one standard deviation of national pride reduces preferences for 
redistribution by an amount similar in size (but opposite in sign) to that of an increase in 
confidence in the EU. Tests all reject the hypothesis of exogeneity, and the F-test of the 
first stage regression both exceed 10 suggesting that instruments are not weak. 
Furthermore, the instrument (join the euro) exhibits the expected sign. As expected, 
looking at the first stage regression we find that women, older individuals, married 
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and people without tertiary education, unemployed and from smaller towns are more likely 
to exhibit national pride. 
As expected the coefficient for tertiary education remains strongly significant and 
negatively associated with redistributive preferences. Interestingly, income and tertiary 
education have an opposite effect on national  pride. Again all regressions control for 
country fixed effects. Some important differences across specifications when national 
pride and confidence in the EU are estimated refer to the effect of age, which only the 
effect of  age squared turns out to be significant when explaining national pride. In 
contrast, age exhibits a reverse nonlinear effect in explaining confidence in the EU and 
redistributive preferences. The pattern of coefficients in Table 0 remains in Table 1 
when redistributive preferences are binarised. The interpretation is that the probability 
of supporting redistribution declines by 2.5% if individuals exhibit national pride, and 
increases by the same magnitude if they have confidence in the EU. Tables 6.4 and 11 
in the Appendix show that this effect is primarily driven by older-age and low- income 
individuals. On this basis we can conclude that the the instrumental strategy we employ 
appears to provide consistent and robust results, given that alternative instruments 
provide similar results. 
 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
 
Tables 4 and 5 report the regression estimates using different instruments. In Table 4 we 
use alternative instruments of EU confidence such as a dummy indicating whether the 
country has joined the EU, average confidence in the EU (of other countries in the 
sample) to predict confidence and average pride (of other countries in the sample) to 
predict pride. The exogeneity and F tests coefficients all suggest they are not weak 
instruments and the coefficients are all exhibiting the same sign although vary in terms 
of the impact. An expansion of EU confidence exerts a larger positive effect now than the 
negative effects of national pride. Then in Table 3 we examine other instruments such 
as the duration of citizenship education, which turns out to be a weak instrument, and 
the number of medals in the Olympics games which was a strong instrument for 
national pride and results in the IV analysis showing a significant and comparable 
coefficient as in other regressions estimates. 
 
Table 6 shows that the estimates predicting redistributive preferences are robust to 
the inclusion of political preferences. As before, the inclusion of different instruments 
suggests the same reverse-sign effect in the coefficient for EU confidence which now 
turns positive when including the political control in the estimates with the alternative 
instruments used in Table 3. As expected, the more to the right an individual positions 
himself the less likely he is to support redistribution. All estimates exhibit an important 
nonlinear trend which captures among other effects that of time-varying macroeconomic 
and contextual effects. 
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Table 1: OLS baseline results 
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Table 2 IV baseline results
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Table 3: Redistribution binarised 
 
  
III Working paper 3                                                                 J. Costa-Font and F. Cowell 
 
26  
 
Table 4: Additional instruments I 
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Table 5: Additional instruments II 
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Table 6: Additional covariates 
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5. Conclusion 
The rescaling of spatial identity in the context of European integration processes is 
potentially an important effect underpinning changes in redistributive preferences. This 
paper has provided evidence to support that claim. However, unlike previous research 
that mainly stresses the importance of group identity, we have argued that the scale of 
geographical identification matters. Specifically, the development of a European identity 
appears to weaken national pride. But how important is this new collective identity in 
shifting preferences for redistribution? The answer to this question could help to explain 
the limited evidence of median-voter  explanations  for redistributive preferences. Indeed, 
in addition to the information problems people face in identifying their position in the 
income distribution, when making redistributive judgments, they appear to react to 
change in the spatial scale of reference. So the expansion of the European integration 
process together with the introduction of a common currency exerts a non-neutral 
influence in the context that influences redistributive preferences. 
 
This paper has specifically examined the effects of spatial identity in those countries 
that joined the EU after 2004 where we can identify the introduction of reforms expanding 
European integration and the effect of joining the single currency. Unlike the case of the 
founding countries of the Eurozone we can identify the effect of joining a European club 
more precisely using the recent- joiners sample. We find a positive (negative) impact 
of European identity (national identity) on preferences for redistribution. The effect of 
identity is comparable in size to the effect of income and is only exceeded by the effect of 
tertiary education. 
These results indicate that institutional changes involving symbolic features that define 
one’s identity – in this case the currency – can exert an impact on people’s attachments, 
and more specifically can underpin the formation of a person’s identity. We find robust 
evidence suggesting that the introduction of the euro as a common currency in 
countries that joined the EU after 2004 increased people’s confidence in the European 
Union, and reduced the importance of national pride. Similarly, this evidence is replicated 
when other potential identity instruments are examined. Using an instrumental variable 
strategy, we find that the exogenous change in European identity resulting from a 
common currency increases people’s preference for redistribution. These results are 
consistent with the previous identity literature.16 
 
Among the policy implications of these findings it appears that there are important 
positive knock-on effects on redistributive preferences associated with furthering 
European integration. The lessening of national pride is more likely to lead to changes in 
individuals’ reference points which influence the way they form preferences for 
redistribution 
 
 
16  See Shayo (2009) and Costa-Font and Cowell (2015) for a review.  
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Table 7: OLS results – restricted sample without Latvia and Lithuania 
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Table 8: IV results – restricted sample without Latvia and Lithuania 
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Appendix A.1 - Data 
 
A.1.1 Summary characteristics 
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Source:”Citizenship education in Europe” 
Available data (all for 2010/2011): 
 
A 1.2 Background information: Citizenship education 
• Provision of a separate, compulsory subject focused on elements of 
citizenship education, according to national curricula (ISCED17 1, 2 and 3), 
2010/11. 
• Citizenship education taught as a separate subject or integrated into other 
subjects, by ages, according to national curricula, 2010/11. 
• subject during a notional year, based on the recommendations for primary, general 
(lower and upper) secondary education, 2010/11. 
• Average minimum taught time devoted to citizenship education as a separate  
 
Some information on the concept of citizenship education: “The civic competences 
needed to be able to actively exercise citizenship, as defined by the European framework 
for key competences, focus on: a knowledge of basic democratic concepts including an 
understanding of society and social and political movements; the European integration 
process and EU structures; and major social developments, both past and present. 
 
17 International Standard Classification of Education http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-
standard-classification-of- education.aspx 
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Civic competences also require skills such as critical thinking and communication skills, 
and  the ability and willingness to participate constructively in the public domain, 
including in the decision-making process through voting. Finally, a sense of belonging to 
society at various levels, a respect for democratic values and diversity as well as 
support for sustainable development are also highlighted as integral components of civic 
competences. In the context of this report, citizenship education refers to the aspects 
of education at school level intended to prepare students to become active citizens, by 
ensuring that they have the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes to contribute to the 
development and well-being of the society in which they live. It is a broad concept, 
which encompasses not only teaching and learning in the classroom but also practical 
experiences gained through school life and activities in wider society. It encompasses 
the narrower concept of â€˜civic education’, as defined by the IEA,18 which is restricted to 
’knowledge and understanding of formal institutions and processes of civic life (such as 
voting in elections)” (IEA 2010a, p. 22). 
 
2004/05: Age at which pupils are taught citizenship education as a separate 
compulsory subject and duration of this provision in primary and general secondary 
education. 
 
2010/11: Citizenship education taught as a separate subject or integrated into other 
subjects, by ages, according to national curricula. 
 
A 1.3 Background information: Foreign language proficiency 
 
a) Source: “Recommended annual instruction time in full-time compulsory education in 
Europe 2013/14”.•  
 
Available data: 
 
• Number  of  hours  and  grades  attained  by  school  year  for  foreign languages 
1 for 9 out of 12 countries. 
• Number of hours and grades attained  for by school year  for  foreign languages 2 
for 6 out of 12 countries. 
 
b) Source: “Key data on teaching languages at school in Europe 2012” 
Note:  In  this  publication,  there  are  also  trends  available  in  different  years; however, 
the changes are usually none or small. 
 
Available data: 
• Starting ages for the first and second foreign languages as compulsory 
subjects for all students in pre-primary, primary and/or general secondary 
education,  
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18 International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement– http://www.iea.nl/ 
• 2010/11. 
• Starting age and duration of first foreign language as a compulsory subject in 
pre-primary, primary and/or general secondary education, reference years 
1993/94, 2002/03, 2006/07, 2010/11. 
• Starting age and duration of second foreign language as a compulsory subject 
in pre-primary, primary and/or general secondary education, 2002/03, 2006/07, 
2010/11. 
• Provision of foreign languages as core curriculum options in primary and/or 
general secondary level, 2010/11. 
• Percentage of students learning 0, 1, 2 or more language(s) in general upper 
secondary education (ISCED 3), 2004/05, 2006/07, 2009/10. 
• Trends in the percentage of students learning English, German and French in 
lower secondary education (ISCED 2), in 2004/05, 2006/07, 2009/10. 
• Trends in the recommended minimum number of hours of compulsory foreign 
language teaching during a notional year in primary and full- time compulsory 
general secondary education, 2006/07 and 2010/11. 
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A 1.4 Background information: Medals in Olympic Games 
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A.2 Summary statistics of sample 
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A.3 Trends in preference and identity variables 
 
Figures A.1 to A.6 depict the trends in key variables across interview years and across 
survey waves for those countries that joined the European Union before 2004 and those 
countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 2013. 
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A.4 Regressions: further analysis 
Tables A.8 to A.10 show the subsample analysis for different age, income and gender 
groups, respectively. Table A.11 shows the 1st and 2nd stage of instrumental variables 
regression for alternative main regressors. Columns (1) and (2) show citizencountry (“I 
see myself as a citizen of the [country] nation”, with answers on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree)); columns (3) and (4) show citizeneu (“I see myself as a 
citizen of the European Union”, with answers on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 
(strongly agree)); columns (5) and (6) show the binary variable eu_notcountry taking a 
value of 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees to the statement “I see myself as a 
citizen of the EU” and disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement “I see myself as 
a citizen of the [country] nation”, and 0 otherwise; columns (7) and (8) show the binary 
variable country_noteu taking a value of 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees to the 
statement “I see myself as a citizen of the [country] nation” and disagrees or strongly 
disagrees with the statement “I see myself as a citizen of the EU”, and 0 otherwise; 
columns (9) and (10) show the binary variable country_and_eu taking a value of 1 if 
respondent agrees or strongly agrees to both the statements “I see myself as a citizen of 
the [country] nation” and “I see myself as a citizen of the EU”, and 0 otherwise. The 
dependent variable redistribution takes values from 1 (we need larger income differences 
as incentives for individual effort) to 10 (incomes should be made more equal); 
independent variables included are age, age squared, female, secondary incomplete, 
secondary, tertiary, married, children, income, unemployed, town size, wave, and wave 
squared. 
Table A.12 investigates cohort effects; cohort_euro is a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if the euro was introduced during the age 16 to 25 (impressionable years); 
proud_cohort is national pride  interacted with cohort_euro; joineuro_cohort is joineuro 
interacted with cohort_euro. Column(1) shows an OLS regression, columns (2) and (3) 
show the 1st and 2nd stage of an instrumental variables regression, with joineuro_cohort 
as an instrument for proud_cohort in the 2nd stage (column (3)). The dependent 
variable redistribution takes values from 1 (we need larger income differences as 
incentives for individual effort) to 10 (incomes should be made  more equal). Independent 
variables included are age, age squared, female, secondary incomplete, 
secondary,tertiary, married, children, income, unemployed, town size, wave, and wave 
squared. 
 
Table A.13 shows the interaction of national pride with income; proud_income is 
national pride interacted with the income variable and joineuro_income is the interaction 
of the variables joineuro and income. Column (1) shows an OLS regression, columns (2) 
and (3) show the 1st and 2nd stage of an instrumental  
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variables regression with national pride instrumented with joineuro; columns (4) and 
(5) show proud_income instrumented with joineuro_income. The dependent variable 
redistribution takes values from 1 (we need larger income differences as incentives 
for individual effort) to 10 (incomes should be made more equal). Independent variables 
included are age, age squared, female, secondary incomplete, secondary, tertiary, 
married, children, income, unemployed, town size, wave, and wave squared. 
 
Table A.14 shows the 1st and 2nd stage of instrumental variables regression for 
alternative instruments; columns (1) to (4) use duration of the first foreign language (in 
years) in compulsory schooling for each country/year; columns 
(5) to (8) use the first component of a principal components analysis consisting of the 
variables duration of first  foreign language,  duration of citizenship education as a 
separate subject, and number of medals in Olympic 
summer games. The dependent variable redistribution takes values from 1 (we need 
larger income differences as incentives for individual effort) to 10 (incomes should be 
made more equal); independent variables included are age, age squared, female, 
secondary incomplete, secondary, tertiary, married, children, income, unemployed, town 
size, wave, and wave squared. 
 
Table A.15 shows the OLS regressions and Table 18 shows the 1st and 2nd stage of 
an instrumental variables regressions, for the full sample of European countries, not only 
those that joined the European Union after 2003. The countries/years included are 
Bulgaria (1997), Bulgaria (2005), Cyprus (2006), Cyprus (2011), Estonia (1996), Estonia 
(2011), Finland (1996), Finland (2005), France (2006), Germany (1997), Germany 
(2006), Germany (2013), Hungary (1998),   Hungary   (2009),   Italy   (2005),   Latvia   
(1996),   Lithuania   (1997), Netherlands (2006), Netherlands (2012), Poland (1997), 
Poland (2005), Poland (2012),  Romania  (1998),  Romania  (2005),  Romania  (2012),  
Slovakia  (1998), Slovenia (1995), Slovenia (2005), Slovenia (2011), Spain (1995), 
Spain (2000),Spain (2007), Spain (2011), Sweden (1996), Sweden (2006), Sweden 
(2011) and Great Britain (2005). 
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A.5 Convergence criteria  
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Table A.17: Correlation coefficients between redistribution and convergence criteria 
 
 
 
Table A.18: Convergence criteria: data and definitions 
 
 
 
 
